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BANK DIVESTITURES AND
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH: A NOTE
Jeff Madura

During the 1980s, the commercial banking industry experienced geographical and product deregulation, revised capital requirements, and increasing
international competiuon. Bank holding companies (BHCs) have responded LO the cha nges by restructuring their operations. One common form of
restructuring is the acquisition of other financial institutions. Several studies
have assessed the share price response of the acquiring banks, including those
by Desai and Stover ( I 985), Neely ( 1987) and Sushka and Bendeck ( 1988).
Related studies have also assessed the share price response to the acquisition
of failing banks (Pett,\ay and Trifts, 1985; James and Wier, 1987) and the
acquisition of mortgage banks (Swary, I981 ). While these studies yield mixed
results, they generally shO\, evidence of a significant share price response
of the acquiring banks. A second form of restructuring is divestment of assets, which was abo a common activity for BHCs in the 1980s. To the extent
that the acquirn1on of ne,, as ets elicited a bank share price response, so
may divestitures, although the response may not necessarily be the same. The
objective of this study is 10 measure the share price response attributed LO
divestitures in order to offer 111ferences about possible signals renected within
di\'estiture announcements.
In the follo,,ing section, reasons for a share price reaction 10 restructuring announcements are cited. Then, related research I provided. e,1, the
methodology and data used to achie,e the obJecme is described. rinally,
results are disclosed and inferences are offered.
Po, .,ible Share Price Rcspon'>e to Dhcstiturc<,
Divestuures could elicit a fa\ arable share price response 1f they Will en
hance the firm\ managerial effo:ienc) (Skantz and 1arches1m, 1987). Those
dives111ures that allo,, a firm 10 concentrate on a spec1f1c line of bus111ess
are more likely 10 enhance managerial efficiency. Rini (1989) suggests that
managerial efficienc\ ma) 1mpro\'C ,, hen banks divest operations that are
different from the normal lines or business, s111ce they cause negau,e synergies.
Some divestitures may 111crease ,hareholder \\Calth by pro,1ding special
tax benefits. In the bank111g 111dust ry, d1vcsmures may represent a \'iable
method for rais111g the capual rauo. The desired capual ratio may be achieved
by reducing assets rather than by I suing tock 10 increase capital. In this
way, BHCs may at least avoid the typical negati\e hare price re ponse associated with stock issua nce (detected by Wamley and Dhillon, 1989, a nd
other ).
Di vest itures can eli mi nate proJects with a negative net pre ent value and
therefore may enhance firm value. Some dive titures may re ult from the
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acceptance of related projects. For example, the termination of one project
as a result of developing a mutually exclusive project with a higher net present
value could enhance firm value (Statman and Sepe, 1989).
Rizzi (1989) states that more than one-third of all business· segments controlled by bank holding companies earn less than their cost of capital. Divestitures of those segments can significantly enhance a bank's return on assets.
Rizzi also suggests that profitable segments should also be considered fo r
divestitures if the potential payment for the segments is sufficient. Divestitures could possibly elicit a negative share price response if they signal cash
flow deficiencies. Such divestitures would be initiated because of the need
for cash to support operations. Another possible reason for a negative share
price reaction to divestitures is reduced diversification benefits. If a firm is
well diversified, its unsystematic risk is negligible, so that the only risk of
concern is its systematic risk. Firms that reduce risk through diversification
may be able to increase their debt capacity. They may also lower their cost
of capital, since creditors favor the more stable cash flows that results from
diversification. To the extent that the divestitures by bank holding companies reduce their degree of diversification, the favorable effects described
above are eliminated. Thus, bank holding companies could experience an
unfavorable share price response to announced divestitures.
According to Master (1989), divestitures could reduce the bank's appeal
to potential acquiring firms, and some banks may divest assets desired by
other firms in order to prevent a takeover. To the extent that divestitures
reduce the probability of a takeover, the} may increase agency costs. According to O'Hara (1983), Master (1989) and others, agency costs are nontrivial for banks. If divestitures cause an increase in agency costs, they could
elicit an unfavorable market response.
Related Literature on Oi\estiture!>
The market reaction to divestiture announcements by industrial corporations has been assessed in numerous studie . For example, studies b:i, Miles
and Rosenfeld (I 983), Zaima and Hearth (I 985), Alexander, Benson, and
Kampmeyer (1984), Jain (1985), and Skant7 and Marchesmi (1987) found
a favorable share price response to firms that were divesung assets. Furthermore, Zaima and Hearth (1985), and Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer
( 1984) found that the magnitude of the reaction ,, as positively associated
with the siLe of the divestiture.
A recent study by Stat man and Sepe ( 1989) assessed the market reaction
to announced discontinued operations by industrial firms over a 15-year period. They found a significant fa vorab le sha re price response to the announcements. They conclude that such announcements are good news and suggest
the reason is that the news signals to shareholders that "managers will no
longer throw good money after bad ... The good news that shareholders
receive with termination decisions is similar to news that they receive a
takeover bid or at the death of a n executive who hung on too long to his
34
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job. It is the news that the amount of good mone} thrown after bad ,,ill
be less than expected."
Overall, the results of the,e studic ,uggest that the poten11al economic
efficiencie or other benefits tend to outweigh any adverse effects associated
with dive titures Yet, di,·e,titlire, by Bl-IC, may elicit a different share price
re pon e because of their unique operating and regulatory characteristic,.
Mcthodolog) and Data
The ample uul11ed in tlm ,tudy comisl\ of large BHCs that di,estcd a,sets between 1982 and 1989, and ,, ho,e announcement \\as Clled in the \\ all
treet J ournal. The ,tandard e\ent stud) methodology is used to anal),e the
data. Dail} stock prices for a period encompa,smg 136 day, prior to the announcement date and 15 da)s aft en\ ard, arc compiled from the CRSP tapes
for each firm in the ,ample. A one-Iactor, return-generating process is applied here:
\\ here:

B + B R + \
the return on the j' ,tocl-.: o,cr day
the return on the market inde, (5&P 500)
the intercept term
the ,lope coetlic1cnt \\hich mca,ure, ')'tcmatic
mk ol the jth lirm
a random d1,turbance term

R
R
R
B
B

bused to e,11mate the return, lor each lirm in the ,ample o,er an e,umation pcnod ~O\ ering 136 to 16 trading da), prior to the announcement It
i, a,sumcd that e ,,1ti,l1e, thc a"umption, ol the linear regrc"ion modcl:
E(\ )
0 I or all t
CO\!(\ . \ l
O 101 all 1-.:JO
(0\(\ . R )
0 l01 all 1
Adju,tmcnt, arc made lor .ill ,1od; ,plit, belorc cal ul,1tmg the dail)
return,. The use ol the ~cl..P 500 as a market pro-..) 1, l.'.011',i,1ent \\ith the
methodolog} u,e<l 111 numerom othl.'.r l.'.\Cnt ,1ud1e,.
The ri,k-adiu,ted pcrlormance ol each ,to1..k t1\er the e,aminauon period
(cO\ering 9 da), before an<l 9 <la), ,1fte1 the mitial announcement) 1s e,11
mated b) cakulatin~ the re,1<luah or abnormal return e , a,:
,.,
e = R , • (b + b R )

where b and b .ire ord111a1) least ,quare, (OL">) e,timate, ol the ,lope an<l
0
intercept paramctcr, l he ,1gn1f1L.tnce ol the abnormal return 1, tested u,ing the follO\\ mg te,1 ,tati,111.:
Htati,tic

-

where SD

e

SD

standard de\ 1a1ion of e 0\er the estimation period.
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The cumulative average abnormal return for each firm included in the sample is estimated as:
I n

CAR = _ l:eJ,
n j= I
where n = 32
The following test statistic is used to assess the significance of the cumulative abnormal returns:
t

=

CAR
SDJ,J'"N

where = number of days in the interval. This statistic was used by Desai
and Stover ( 1985).
Results

Results of the analysis are disclosed in Table 1. Since the Wall Street Journal
announcement was used as the announcement date (Day t), the news became
publicly available by Day t-1. Five of the first eight abnormal returns over
the examination period were negative, but none were significant. The abnormal returns over the next nine days are positive. The only significant market reaction is on Day t + 3 in which the abnormal return was .9379 percent.
From Day t forward, cumulative abnormal returns were positive. They
reached 1.88 percent on Day t + 7 before declining. None of the cumulative
abnormal returns throughout the examination period were significa nt.
Implications

Overall, the announcements by BHCs to divest operations did not elicit
a significant market response. One interpretation is that divestitures carry
offsetting advantages and disadvantages. While divestitures may signal the
end of good money thrown after bad, investors might not have realized that
the operations were not adequately performing in the first place. Alternatively, any favorable effects are offset by the reduced diversification benefits
resulting from divestitures.
Since the uniform capital adequacy guidelines were established in 1988,
the benefits of a divestiture could become more pronounced. There is now
more pressure on BHCs to maintain a higher level of capital. Divestitures
may be perceived as a more appropriate means of achieving a specified capital ratio than issuing stock, since stock issuances have consistently been found
to elicit a negative share price response. If investors believe that divestitures
are enacted with the intention to meet capital guidelines, in vestors may react
more favo rably. Most of the divestitures in our sample occurred before the
uniform capital guidelines were imposed, and therefore cannot be used to
test this hypothesis. Yet, the market reaction to fu ture divestitures deserves
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Table l
Abnormal Returns urrounding
The Announced Divestitures
Day
Relative to
Announcement
1-9
1-8
1-7
1-6
1-5
1-4
t-3
t-2
1-1
I

t+I
1+2
t+3
t+4
t+5
1+6
t+7
1+8
t+9
t+I

Abnormal
Returns

t-\alue

0.003561
0.0002 18
-0.003276
-0.000073
-0.003192
0.003472
-0.000678
-0.002627
0.000754
0.002421
0.001063
0.001606
0.009379
0.000507
0.004639
0.001086
0.000427
-0.003910
-0.001385
0.004152

1.080629
-0.066 155
-0.994143
-0.022153
-0.968652
1.053621
-0.205747
-0.797196
0.228811
0. 734682
0.322580
0.487361
2.846174*
0.153855
1.407762
0.329560
0.12957
- 1.186538
-0.429295
1.259976

Cumulative
Abnormal
Returns
0.003561
0.003343
0.000067
-0.000006
-0.003199
0.000274
-0.000404
-0.003031
-0.002277
0.000145
0.001208
0.002814
0.012913
0.012700
0.017338
0.018851
0.018851
0.014941
0.013556
0 017708

t-rnlue
1.080629
0. 717342
0.011739
-0.0099 10
-0.434144
0.033945
-0.046338
-0.325196
-0.230328
0.013915
0.110529
0.2465 12
1.026228
1.030017
1.358495
1.397748
1.387442
1.06868 I
0.943756
1.20159

*Significant at the .01 level.
to be assessed to determine,, hcther the reaction 1 ,ens1t1, e to the more tringent capital requirement\.
A related extem1on for future rc\earch is the di,e\titure of bank loans by
BHCs. Loans are not normally con\1dered as opcrauons, but repre\ent a large
proportion of bank as\et,. Loan sale, could 111nuence market value if there
is asymmetric information that is kno" n by the bank but not by 1mes1ors
about the quality of the loan~. Loan sale have become more popular as a
result of the ne,~ cap11al requirements. By reducing the a\SCt value wuhout
reducing cap1tal, loan sales can booM the 8 1IC's capital ratio. They also generate immediate revenue a nd can ~enc a\ an important ource of funds.
As this study offers some insight about the market reaction to bank di\ e ·
titure in general, it rai es que tions about pecific types of dive tirnre . Given
the wave of bank restructuring during this period of inter tate and global
expansion, these que tions should be addressed in future re earch.
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